Radical Enactivism
Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative
Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto
University of Hertfordshire
"This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the current cutting-edge developments in the embodied and situated sciences of the mind will want to read this book."
Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK
[Consciousness & Emotion Book Series, 2]
2006.
x, 256 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Hardbound – Available
ISBN
9789027241511
|
EUR
110.00
|
USD
165.00
e-Book – Sold by e-book platforms
ISBN
9789027293091
|
EUR
110.00
|
USD
165.00
Table of Contents
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Author's addresses
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vii–viIi
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dedication
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viii
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Introduction: What is radical enactivism?
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1–12
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Unprincipled engagements: Emotional experience, expression and response
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13–38
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Feelings and objects
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39–43
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Impossible problems and careful expositions: Reply to Myin and De Nul
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45–64
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Unnatural feelings
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65–80
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Both Bradley and Biology: Reply to Rudd
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81–105
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Intentionality and emotion: Comment on Hutto
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107–119
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Against passive intellectualism: Reply to Crane
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121–149
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Emotional experience and understanding
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151–155
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Embodied expectations and extended possibilities: Reply to Goldie
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157–177
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From feeling to thinking: (through others)
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179–184
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Four Herculean labours: Reply to Hobson
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185–221
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The narrative alternative to theory of mind
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223–229
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Narrative practice and understanding reasons: Reply to Gallagher
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231–247
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Index
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249–255
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Quotes
“Enactivists criticize representational views of the mind and emphasize the importance of embodiment and action to cognition, but often differ beyond this overall agreement. This volume offers a window onto these differences by presenting enactivists and theorists sympathetic to enactivism in dialogue with each other. For anyone interested in the enactive approach, this volume is essential reading.”
Evan Thompson, University of Toronto
“Dan Hutto's 'Radical Enactivism' stakes out new and exciting territory in the debate concerning embodiment, emotion, and intentionality. This volume sees that account first elaborated, and then subject to intense, multi-faceted scrutiny. The result is an enthralling exercise in constructive engagement that takes the debate to a whole new level. Essential reading for all those interested in mind, action, and experience.”
Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh, UK
“Consciousness doesn't unfold in the caverns of our mind. We act it out, skillfully, in the course of our daily lives. Or so a growing number of thinkers, including Hutto, are insisting. This collection of papers -- offering critical discussion of Hutto's work, from a range of different perspectives -- will make a marked contribution to this growing discussion. I recommend it to researchers and students alike.”
Alva Noë , University of Berkeley
“Enactivist accounts of mental processes are currently among the hottest properties in philosophical psychology. This volume, focusing on the relation between enactivism and mental representation, not only provides a significant contribution to an important debate; it also succeeds in steering this debate in new and interesting directions.
”
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Mark Rowlands, University of Hertfordshire
Subjects
Benjamins Subject classification
Consciousness Research
Psychology
BIC Subject
JMT: States of consciousness
BISAC Subject
PSY020000: PSYCHOLOGY / Neuropsychology
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number: 2006043044