Epistemic logic
Table of contents
The main concern of epistemic logic is to formulate a formal system to deal with logical issues arising from an analysis of epistemological concepts such as knowledge, belief, and assertion. Instead of dealing with the essentially factual issues of alethic logic — i.e. what is actually, what must necessarily be the case or what can possibly be the case — it relates to what people know or believe or maintain or doubt to be the case. The concept ‘epistemic’ derives from the Greek word ἐπιστημη, which means ‘scientifically supported knowledge’ (Plato, Phaedo 96b).
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