Mind Ascribed

An elaboration and defence of interpretivism

Bruno Mölder | University of Tartu
ISBN 9789027252166 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
ISBN 9789027287748 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
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This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness – perception and the awareness of one’s own mental states – in the interpretivist framework. (Series A)
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 80] 2010.  xii, 293 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Cited by

Cited by 22 other publications

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Curry, Devin Sanchez
2020. Interpretivism and norms. Philosophical Studies 177:4  pp. 905 ff. DOI logo
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2021. Interpretivism without Judgement-Dependence. Philosophia 49:2  pp. 611 ff. DOI logo
Curry, Devin Sanchez
2021. How beliefs are like colors. Synthese 199:3-4  pp. 7889 ff. DOI logo
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2023. Morgan's Quaker gun and the species of belief. Philosophical Perspectives 37:1  pp. 119 ff. DOI logo
Fernández Castro, Víctor
2023. Folk psychology without metaphysics: An expressivist approach. South African Journal of Philosophy 42:2  pp. 128 ff. DOI logo
Fernández Castro, Víctor
2024. An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions. Philosophical Explorations 27:1  pp. 86 ff. DOI logo
Hepworth, Katherine
2016. History, power and visual communication artefacts. Rethinking History 20:2  pp. 280 ff. DOI logo
Horowitz, Amir
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2024. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts. Philosophical Explorations 27:1  pp. 41 ff. DOI logo
Kalis, Annemarie
2019. No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention. Frontiers in Psychology 10 DOI logo
Levy, Gabriel
2018. Can Fictional Superhuman Agents have Mental States?. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 30:4-5  pp. 425 ff. DOI logo
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2023. Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107:2  pp. 413 ff. DOI logo
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2020. Can Deflationism Save Interpretivism?. Philosophia 48:2  pp. 709 ff. DOI logo
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2022. How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13:1  pp. 85 ff. DOI logo
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2023. The meta-metaphysics of group beliefs: in search of alternatives. Synthese 201:4 DOI logo
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2023. Folk Psychological Models and the Metaphysics of Belief. A Reply to Curry. Philosophia 51:2  pp. 919 ff. DOI logo
Schroeder, Timothy
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Consciousness Research

Consciousness research



Main BIC Subject

HPM: Philosophy of mind

Main BISAC Subject

PHI015000: PHILOSOPHY / Mind & Body
ONIX Metadata
ONIX 2.1
ONIX 3.0
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2010028101 | Marc record