Being in Time

Dynamical models of phenomenal experience

| Cornell University
| Stony Brook University
| University of Pennsylvania
ISBN 9789027213549 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
e-Book Buy from our e-platform
ISBN 9789027273598 | EUR 99.00 | USD 149.00
Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood — indeed, can only be understood — as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, through surveys and synthesis of behavioral and neuroscientific findings, to computational analysis. This collection's broad scope and integrative approach, characterized by the view of the brain as a dynamical system that computes the mind's representation space, will be of interest to researchers, instructors, and students in the cognitive sciences wishing to acquaint themselves with the current thinking in consciousness research. Series B.
[Advances in Consciousness Research, 88]  2012.  xvi, 261 pp.
Publishing status: Available
Table of Contents
Time after time: Temporality in the dynamic brain
Dan Lloyd
Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
Rafael Malach
From probabilities to percepts: A subcortical “global best estimate buffer” as locus of phenomenal experience
Bjorn Merker
Being in time
Shimon Edelman and Tomer Fekete
The (lack of) mental life of some machines
Tomer Fekete and Shimon Edelman
Restless minds, wandering brains
Cees van Leeuwen and Dirk J.A. Smit
Fuzzy consciousness
Stephanie Huette and Michael J. Spivey
Two dynamical themes in Husserl
Jeffrey Yoshimi
Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness
Wanja Wiese and Thomas Metzinger
The brain and its states
Richard Brown
An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness
Rick Dale, Deborah P. Tollefsen and Christopher T. Kello
“According to physics textbooks, time is expected to occupy an ever-shifting point with no width. But how does such an instantaneous present accommodate with our long lasting and content-rich conscious experience? This intriguing book, authored by distinguished scholars in the field, offers several insights about the problem of the dynamics of experience from different perspectives, ranging from cognitive science and philosophy to computer science and neurobiology.”
“The problem of consciousness is hard, so a book trying to solve it is brave. The chapters by the multiple authors of Being in Time make a bold attempt to account for consciousness in terms of the dynamics of brain processes unfolding in time. As such, the book is more about “feeling in time” than “being in time” (as even a teapot is being in time). [...] The dynamics of our doings already distinguish us from a teapot. Whether they are also sufficient to explain the fact that, unlike a teapot, we feel, the reader will have to judge. This dynamic book will well reward the reader’s time.


Consciousness Research

Consciousness research
BIC Subject: JMR – Cognition & cognitive psychology
BISAC Subject: PSY008000 – PSYCHOLOGY / Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
U.S. Library of Congress Control Number:  2012016358
Cited by

Cited by other publications

Edelman, Shimon
2012. Vision, Reanimated and Reimagined. Perception 41:9  pp. 1116 ff.
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Barbara
2016.  In Conceptualizations of Time [Human Cognitive Processing, 52],  pp. ix ff.
Ramstead, Maxwell J. D.
2015. Naturalizing what? Varieties of naturalism and transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14:4  pp. 929 ff.
Suarez, David
2017. A dilemma for Heideggerian cognitive science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16:5  pp. 909 ff.

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