Radical Enactivism
Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative
Focus on the philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto
Editor
"This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the current cutting-edge developments in the embodied and situated sciences of the mind will want to read this book."
Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK
[Consciousness & Emotion Book Series, 2] 2006. x, 256 pp.
Publishing status: Available
© John Benjamins Publishing Company
Table of Contents
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Author's addresses | pp. vii–viIi
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dedication | p. viii
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Introduction: What is radical enactivism?Richard Menary | pp. 1–12
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Unprincipled engagements: Emotional experience, expression and responseDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 13–38
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Feelings and objectsErik Myin and Lars De Nul | pp. 39–43
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Impossible problems and careful expositions: Reply to Myin and De NulDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 45–64
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Unnatural feelingsAnthony Rudd | pp. 65–80
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Both Bradley and Biology: Reply to RuddDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 81–105
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Intentionality and emotion: Comment on HuttoTim Crane | pp. 107–119
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Against passive intellectualism: Reply to CraneDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 121–149
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Emotional experience and understandingPeter Goldie | pp. 151–155
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Embodied expectations and extended possibilities: Reply to GoldieDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 157–177
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From feeling to thinking: (through others)R. Peter Hobson | pp. 179–184
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Four Herculean labours: Reply to HobsonDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 185–221
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The narrative alternative to theory of mindShaun Gallagher | pp. 223–229
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Narrative practice and understanding reasons: Reply to GallagherDaniel D. Hutto | pp. 231–247
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Index | pp. 249–255
“Enactivists criticize representational views of the mind and emphasize the importance of embodiment and action to cognition, but often differ beyond this overall agreement. This volume offers a window onto these differences by presenting enactivists and theorists sympathetic to enactivism in dialogue with each other. For anyone interested in the enactive approach, this volume is essential reading.”
Evan Thompson, University of Toronto
“Dan Hutto's 'Radical Enactivism' stakes out new and exciting territory in the debate concerning embodiment, emotion, and intentionality. This volume sees that account first elaborated, and then subject to intense, multi-faceted scrutiny. The result is an enthralling exercise in constructive engagement that takes the debate to a whole new level. Essential reading for all those interested in mind, action, and experience.”
Andy Clark, University of Edinburgh, UK
“Consciousness doesn't unfold in the caverns of our mind. We act it out, skillfully, in the course of our daily lives. Or so a growing number of thinkers, including Hutto, are insisting. This collection of papers -- offering critical discussion of Hutto's work, from a range of different perspectives -- will make a marked contribution to this growing discussion. I recommend it to researchers and students alike.”
Alva Noë , University of Berkeley
“Enactivist accounts of mental processes are currently among the hottest properties in philosophical psychology. This volume, focusing on the relation between enactivism and mental representation, not only provides a significant contribution to an important debate; it also succeeds in steering this debate in new and interesting directions.
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Mark Rowlands, University of Hertfordshire
Cited by
Cited by 15 other publications
Abbott, H. Porter
2011. Reading Intended Meaning Where None Is Intended: A Cognitivist Reappraisal of the Implied Author. Poetics Today 32:3 ► pp. 461 ff. 
De Preester, Helena
2010. Postphenomenology, Embodiment and Technics. Human Studies 33:2-3 ► pp. 339 ff.
Froese, Tom
2024. Irruption and Absorption: A ‘Black-Box’ Framework for How Mind and Matter Make a Difference to Each Other. Entropy 26:4 ► pp. 288 ff.
Heras-Escribano, Manuel
2021. Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism. Synthese 198:S1 ► pp. 337 ff.
Herschbach, Mitchell
2008. Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception. Philosophical Explorations 11:3 ► pp. 223 ff.
Hutto, Daniel D.
2008. Limited Engagements and Narrative Extensions. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16:3 ► pp. 419 ff.
Miller, Brook
2023. Narrativity and Intention. In Narrativity in Cognition, ► pp. 33 ff.
Murphy, Maiya
2017. Enacting the Consequences of the Lecoq Pedagogy's Aesthetic Cognitive Foundation. Theatre Survey 58:3 ► pp. 326 ff.
Palecek, Martin
2022. The ontological turn revisited: Theoretical decline. Why cannot ontologists fulfil their promise?. Anthropological Theory 22:2 ► pp. 154 ff.
Paolucci, Claudio
2019. Social cognition, mindreading and narratives. A cognitive semiotics perspective on narrative practices from early mindreading to Autism Spectrum Disorder. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18:2 ► pp. 375 ff.
Radman, Zdravko
2012. Body, Brain, and Beauty: The Place of Aesthetics in the World of the Mind. Diogenes 59:1-2 ► pp. 41 ff.
Radman, Zdravko & Jeanne Delbaere-Garant
2012. Corps, cerveau et beauté la place de l'esthétique dans le domaine de l'esprit. Diogène n° 233-234:1 ► pp. 58 ff.
Ricca, Mario
2018. Cultures in Orbit, or Justi-fying Differences in Cosmic Space: On Categorization, Territorialization and Rights Recognition. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 31:4 ► pp. 829 ff.
Summa, Michela
2014. Enacting perception: the relevance of phenomenology. PARADIGMI :2 ► pp. 97 ff.
Walmsley, Lachlan Douglas
2020. Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism. Adaptive Behavior 28:6 ► pp. 453 ff.
This list is based on CrossRef data as of 16 april 2024. Please note that it may not be complete. Sources presented here have been supplied by the respective publishers. Any errors therein should be reported to them.
Subjects
Consciousness Research
Psychology
Main BIC Subject
JMT: States of consciousness
Main BISAC Subject
PSY020000: PSYCHOLOGY / Neuropsychology