Inside names
A contextualist approach to the syntax and semantics of direct reference
In this contribution, we offer a contextualist analysis of names whereby a name N is used as a felicitous
referential term in all and only those contexts of utterance in which N is intended to refer to a unique referent by all cognitive
agents that are relevant in the context. This analysis has important across-the-board virtues. It reduces the distance between
common nouns and names, under the insight that names are a highly specific case of a more general phenomenon consisting in the
pragmatic modulation of the meaning of common nouns. It successfully ties to an important body of syntactic evidence, and
contributes to elucidate, in an original and productive manner, many of the unsolved issues concerning the syntactic structure of
(complex) names. Finally, it makes a number of philosophical puzzles virtually dissolve without giving up rigid reference for
names, but crucially suggesting that the causal theory of reference becomes far-fetched once the linguistic structure of names and
their actual use in language and cognition have been carefully evaluated.
Article outline
- Introduction
- Some issues about rigid reference
- Nouns and names: Semantic issues
- Names and identity
- Three philosophical puzzles on belief and proper names
- Nouns and names: Syntactic issues
- Conclusions
- Notes
-
References
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Cited by (1)
Cited by one other publication
Fiorin, Gaetano & Denis Delfitto
2024.
A contextual theory of fictional names.
Intercultural Pragmatics 21:3
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