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2020. Give the Standard Treatment of Fallacies a Chance! Cognitive and Rhetorical Insights into Fallacy Processing. In From Argument Schemes to Argumentative Relations in the Wild [Argumentation Library, 35], ► pp. 41 ff.
2018. Introduction. In Argumentation and Language — Linguistic, Cognitive and Discursive Explorations [Argumentation Library, 32], ► pp. 1 ff.
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